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BACKGROUND AND PRESUPPOSITIONS 
OF THE RULE OF LA W 
Juha-Pekka Rentto 
A 'postmodern' view 
The Rule of Law is a widespread punchword of modern 
jurisprudence as well as of modern political rhetoric. The Rule of 
Law is one of the supposedly seIf-evident principIes by which the 
modern Rechtsstaat is created, maintained, and perpetuated. The 
Rule of Law is even widely considered an important criterion of 
legitimate government. In the latter days, the Rule of Law has 
almost come to take the place of the Rule by God's Will, which 
was formerly considered the main standard of good government. 
Linked to the modernIy deified notion of popular democracy, the 
Rule of Law has nearly reached the transfigured state of 
deification as an unquestioned foundation for the politicaI 
organization and government of a state. 
The task of the present undertaking is to criticize the notion of 
the Rule of Law, and question its sovereign position in the 
modern discussion. This will be done from the viewpoint of 
general practicaI philosophy, through an analysis and criticism of 
the moral and political presuppositions and foundations on which 
the central role of Rule ofLaw supposedly rests. The outcome of 
the discussion which is to follow will appear a paradox: having 
first identified and defined the object of our scrutiny to the best of 
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our ability, we shall proceed to show that, on the one hand, the 
Rule of Law is indeed a central and even practically necessary 
component of the human political organization; but that, on the 
other hand, as an actual political standard it is in an important 
way impossible to live up to and even logically irrelevant for the 
particular situations where it is supposed to be applied. 
The present text was first prepared sorne five years ago for a 
workshop seminar for Finnish and Hungarian scholars of 
constitutional jurisprudence. Part of the background for it is that 
the European press was at that time full of news of what was 
going on in the Eastern parts of Central Europe. One of the 
strikingly oft-repeated thoughts was that the most important task 
ofthe newly emerging Western-style governments was to take all 
the necessary measures needed in order to introduce the the Rule 
of Law. For many Hungarians, as well as for Czechs, Slovaks, 
Poles, etc., the Rule of Law appeared the magic formula which 
would put their country back on its feet after the breakdown of 
'socialist legality'. My motive for preparing this piece for 
presentation to my Hungarian colleagues was to point out the 
Rule of Law, while highly important for the funcioning of 
society, is no magic formula but just the necessary beginning for 
a full flourishing of citizens in the cornmon good of all. 
With the benefit of hindsight, another motive, then un-
conscious but to-day explicit, comes up to the surface: when 1 
first wrote the text at hand 1 considered myself a proponent of 
'Natural Law jurisprudence' or 'jusnaturalism'. The text ought to 
be read, though, as an exposition of how a philosophical 
'jusnaturalism' of the Aristotelian or Thomasian brand in fact 
entails a strong 'legal positivism' on the practical level of 
organizing a society in terms of the Rule of Law. It was this 
insight, too, which made me see things in a different light: 1 
realized that it was not the jusnaturalism which was most 
essential in the Aristotelian-Thomasian jurisprudence, but it 
emphasis on the practical nature of things legal and political: its 
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strength and its appeal lies precisely in its being a jurisprudence 
of the practical reason, with a point, viz. the cornmon good, in 
view. Hence also the notion incorporated in the present text of the 
Rule of Law as a practical necessity if the cornmon good is to be 
reached. In contrast with it, the positivistic notion of the Rule of 
Law, if devoid of a comprehensive inbuilt goal, is simply 
pointless. 
In the present artiele the Rule of Law will be found a curious 
construction of political thought, a construction of central im-
portance for the viability of human society, but whose importance 
rather strangely rests on the very impossibility of its being put 
into actual effect, and on its very irrelevance for its supposed 
particular applications. It reflects my thoughts to-day as it did 
five years ago when a shorter Finnish version of it was published 
in a Finnish yearbook of jurisprudence. But 1 have learnt 
something new after that: towards the elose of the artiele there is 
a section on democratic government and its relationship to the 
Rule of Law. Later 1 have acquired a more structured view of 
democracy via the notion of civil autonomy and the principIe of 
subsidiarity: true democracy is not merely that citizens be 
allowed to participate in decisions conceming the cornmon good, 
but that citizens become fuHy autonomus persons capable of 
legislating for themselves as weH as for each other and of 
assuming primary responsibility for the cornmon good. Hence a 
newly written postscript is appended at the end of the texto 
1. WHATIS IT? 
The Rule of Law is basically rather a simple notion: it denotes 
'accordance with law', and aH are agreed on this most general 
definition. But whose accordance is at stake, when, from whose 
point of view, and with what law;. and what does the accordance 
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consist in? AH these questions provoke a range of different 
answers 1. 
The most fundamental sense of the Rule of Law is that it 
requires a person bound by the law to follow its prescriptions: if 
the law is followed, the Rule of Law reigns. With a view to 
different c1asses of persons, this basic Rule of Law then has 
different applications. Where the supreme authority of a state is 
concemed, it is required to govem by law, and not by arbitrary 
whim. The judge is required to make judgement not by any old 
standard but precisely by the· standard laid down by the law. The 
civil servant is to act according to the prescriptions of the law. 
And the legal subject is required to abide by the law and by the 
lawful judgements and decisions of the servants of law. Usually 
one has the judge and the civil servant in mind when one speaks 
of the Rule of Law. AIso in this · essay, we shall concentrate on 
their supposed duty, imposed on them by the Rule of Law, to put 
the law into effect precisely as the law itself exc1usively requires 
itself to be put into effect. 
One could speak of the Rule of Law in all these respects with 
regard to the Natural Law. But usually 'the Rule of Law' refers to 
the rule of positive law. To be more precise, it refers to a notion 
according to which it is requires that, once a positive legal order 
has been insituted in a community, the laws that are positively 
valid within that order, are to be foHowed by aH in that 
community. Even if the Rule of Law in this way requires 
obedience to the positive laws of a society,-it need not be a 
positivistic principIe. Indeed it most often has a distinct 
jusnaturalist flavour: that the Rule of Law is to govem the 
political community follows from some extralegal consideration 
1. For sorne theories of the Rule of Law, vide Lon L., FULLER, The 
Morality 01 Law; H. J. M. BOUKEMA, Good Law, Towards a Ratioital 
Lawmaking Process and John M. FINNIS, Natural Law and Natural Justice, p. 
270 pp., and FINNIS, The Authority 01 Law in the Predicament 01 Contem-
porary Social Theory, p. 133 pp. 
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which makes it an important moral or polítical requirement of 
good government. One task of this essay is to show on what 
grounds and in which respect the Rule of Law is a valid criterion 
of good government. 
There are several alternative points of view from which the 
Rule of Law can be considered. One can differentiate between a 
theoretical way of looking at the problem, and a practical one. 
The former properly regards the Rule of Law as a general 
abstraction, and considers it at large, abstracted from all and any 
actual situations. The latter considers the actual aspect of the Rule 
of Law, viz. its applícation to given circumstances and to given 
particular cases. 
Related, if not identical, is a differentiation between what 
might be called the prospective aspect of the Rule of Law, and its 
retrospective aspect2. Rere the former reflects the considerations 
relevant to the situation where no particular occasion to put the 
requirements of the law into effect has yet come up; while 
the latter reflects the situation in which a particular judgment 
or decision by the law is to be made and is under present 
contemplation. In different words, the prospective Rule of Law is 
concemed with the general expectations of citizens with regard to 
the general functioning of the legal order. The retrospective Rule 
of Law, on the other hand, is concerned with the particular 
applícations of law to individual cases. 
In this essay, it will be shown that the Rule of Law is an 
important poli tic al standard from a theoretical point of view. 
This theoretical significance derives from the vital role the 
prospective aspect of the Rule of Law has in the maintenance and 
development of a polítical cornmunity. But despite all this, the 
retrospective Rule of Law is rather a dubious standard: the claim 
that one actually ought to act according to the law in a particular 
context of application is a very problematic one to make. 
2. Vide RENTIO, Prudentia Iuris, p. 333 p. and p. 357 pp. 
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2. ITS PRACTICAL NECESSITY 
The moral foundation 
That the Rule of Law ought to prevail in a state, is far from 
being self-evident. In this section of the essay we intend to show 
in which respect the Rule of Law is a valid criterio n of good 
govemment. The notion that acts of govemment and judicial 
decisions ought to be in explicit accord with the law rests on a 
number of moral and political assumptions, chief among them the 
assumption that law is, the appropriate method of organizing a 
political conrinunity. This assumption is correct, but if we wish to 
understand why and in which way law is the appropriate method, 
we cannot merely as sume it without trying to clarify the argument 
that backs it up3. 
Another important assumption behind the principIe of accor-
dance with the law is that a duty is involved: it is not merely a 
matter of being morally preferrable or laudable to abide by the 
law, but it is considered definitively obligatory to do so. But such 
an obligation cannot simply materialize out of the thin airo 
Besides it is not entirely clear what one means by an obligation to 
abide by the law. Our discussion will not at this point adopt any 
definition of 'obligation'. Instead, we hope to clarify in the course 
of the argument, in which precise respect one is entitled to speak 
of an obligation to the Rule of Law. 
A well-known modem argument for why .a human society 
must be govemed by a legal order is the one presented by H.L.A. 
Hart. According to it, a legal ordering of society is necessary 
because of several human weaknessed, limited human altruism, 
and limited natural resources. As a result Of these fringe con-
ditions, human interaction consists in an unpleasant state of 
3. 1 have previously discussed the same problem from a slight1y different 
angle in my Obligation to Obey? A Modem Myth. 
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constant competition where insecurity and violence easily prevail. 
In order to avoid anarchy, one must organize the society by the 
Rule of Law which regulates the conditions of competition to 
everyont~'s advantage and secures a modicum of social peace4 . 
. Hart's argument is one part of the explanation, but it is not alI. 
Inasmuch as it merely assumes that legal order is better than 
anarchy, it presupposes that order is something good for a human 
community. But why so? Why is not rampant anarchy or random 
despotism best for a human society? - Besides, being based on an 
individualístic and self-interested view of man prone to conflict 
and strife, it fails to take notice of the fact that even a community 
of angel s would need to be organized according to law. Law is 
not needed merely in order to mediate between conflicting 
individual interests but also in order to promote the common 
interests of the entire community. 
Our forthcoming argument will proceed in three steps. We 
shall first present an argument that shows why an authoritative 
ordering is practically necessary for a poli tic al community. Then 
we shall present a different argument for why it is praé:tically 
necessary that the polítical community be ordered with law and 
not with sorne other means. Finally, we shall present an argument 
that shows why the principIe of accordance with the law is a 
central element of every and any enterprise of ordering a 
community by law. 
The common good 
Man naturally seeks that which is good. Good is that which 
men naturally seek. This double insight5 is the frrst starting point 
4. H.L.A. HART, The Concept of Law, p. 189 pp. - For a more 
comprehensive discussion, vide Prudentia Iuris, p. 27 pp. 
5. Expressed in the very opening lines of Nicomachean Ethics, as well as 
in the opening lines of Politics. 
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of practical philosophy in the Aristotelian tradition. It is an 
expression for an underlying teleological ontology: what is, 
consists in not only what is in act, but also in what is in 
potentiality, and in a movement in which potentiality tums into 
actuality. Beings are on their way to their potential ends, and 
these ends are the good natural to each kind of being. Man, in this 
way, has a certain present actuality, a given natural potentiality, 
and a way of moving towards the fulfilment of that potentiality. 
This way of moving is seeking good, i.e. engaging in what we 
call action6. 
What the good natural to human beings is need not concem us 
here. But there is an aspect to human good, whatever it is, which 
is crucial for us: it is shared. Man is not only an individual 
seeking this private individual goods, but fundamentally an other-
directed being seeking common goods together with his fellows. 
In other words, no man is an entirely independent being but a 
part of various communities, be they communities of play, 
cornmunities of utility, or communities of friendship. Now the 
good of these cornmunities, the cornmon good, is the end of the 
individual members, because it consists in nothing but everyone's 
reasonable and rightful sharing in good. A cornmon good is not 
the sum total of individual goods, nor is it something different or 
higher than individual good: it is individual good shared between 
the members of a cornmunity. 
Human beings have a nature that is not entirely determined to 
the good that is natural to them. In other words, man has free will 
to choose between alternative courses of action leading to 
altemative goods. Man is also in many ways imperfect and, most 
importantly, fallible. He is susceptible of mistakes conceming 
what is really good and what merely seems so. Moreover, he is 
6. 1 hope to give a detailed argument of this ontology and many of the 
questions to be taken up in this essay in a forthcoming book entitled 
Reflections on Law and Reality. 
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capable of being habituated to making wrongchoices, i. e. to 
choosing merely apparent goods. If he in this manner develops a 
vice and becomes evil, he will tend to use his reason and will to 
unnatural ends and purposes. So as to avoid lapsing into vice, he 
must exercise virtue, which consists in nothing but an acquired 
personal habit of doing the right thing, i. e. of seeking the good 
that is natural to man and no other thing. In this way, individual 
men are responsable for the formation of their own moral 
character, and can by their own choice beco me good or evil 
persons. 
On this view, morality fundamentalIy demands that individual 
men not only seek good but that they seek nothing but good. In 
this way moral virtue consists in a consistent habit of seeking the 
whole good instead of merely partial goods, and moral evil is 
nothing but choosing apartial good instead of good in its 
totality 7 . In this very manner the good of one individual in 
isolation from others is merely a partial good, whereas the 
common good of a community represents the whole good. 
Therefore, morality requires that one chooses a common good not 
over but as one's individual good. As a consequence, a common 
good is nothing but individual good shared between the members 
of the community in common virtue. 
Each kind of community has its own kind of common good 
and consequentIy its own kind of virtue. The common good and 
characteristic end of a community of play is mutual enjoyment. 
The common good and characteristic end of a community of 
utility is mutual profit. The common good and characteristic 
end of a friendship is mutual sharing of one another. These 
communities are only of a limited scope: they either cover only 
minor spheres of the human life, like communities of play and 
7. Cfr. e. g. Johann MOKRE, Positivitiit und Ethik, where evil is defined as 
selecting one good from the totality of good and treating it as if it were the 
totality of good. Vide etiam Germain GRISEZ - Joseph BOYLE - John FINNIS, 
Practical Principies, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends, esp. p. 125 p. 
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utility; or they are not feasible in a large scala cornmunity, like 
personal friendship. But there is a more comperehensive good 
to be sought than any of these partial goods, viz. the good 
of the perfect community that encompasses aH these partial 
communities under its aegis. This perfect cornmunity is in the 
Aristotelian tradition called the polítical cornmunity, and its good 
is referred to as the cornmon good. 
The common good that is the natural end of the political 
cornmunity as well as of its members is the good of aH, or the 
virtuous sharing of all in their individual goods. Who the 'al!' are, 
need not detain us here: Aristotle thought of the city as a perfect 
cornmunity, whereas Aquinas in the secular context thought of 
the state, and in the eternal context of the community of all 
creation in God. For us, the secular perfect community can as 
well he the state as the global society, depending on the point of 
view. But where law is concerned, the crucial cornmunity is of 
course the one represented by the state. 
The cornmon good of the political community ought morallY 
to be sought, simply because it is the good of the whole 
community rather than just a part of it. It is indeed the moral 
responsibility of each member of the community to seek his own 
good under the aspect of the common good. But in a large 
cornmunity it is difficult for an individual member to be aware of 
and appreciate all the necessary aspects of the cornmon good of 
al!. It is not only the proneness of men to sin and vice, or the 
tendency of society to develop a state of potentially fraudulent 
competition between its members, that difficultates the attainment 
of the common good, but also the simple fact that the sheer 
complexity of society makes it virtually impossible for individual 
citizens to assess the relationship of their personal actions to the 
cornrrion good. As a consequence, if the cornmon good is to be 
sought effectively, the multifarious actions of the individual 
citizens need to be organized, i.e. ordered to the cornmon good, 
on the level of the whole community. Or, in the words of Sto 
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Thomas Aquinas8, as the end of the common good properly 
belongs to the community as a whole, it is also appropriate that 
the cornmunity as a whole seeks to realize it. 
An organization of society into a political cornmunity can in 
principIe be effected in one of two ways: either by unanimous 
decision by the citizenry, or then by the authority of a public 
personage that represents the reasonable will of the citizenry9. 
For most purposes, the first method tends to be impracticable. It 
follows that a political community, if it is to effect the cornmon 
good it seeks, is normally to be ordered to the cornmon good by 
the rule of an authority that bears the responsibility for the 
cornmon good of all. 
Politics 
Only individual human beings can engage in morally 
significant action. Indeed it is the case that actions are by their 
very definition both individual in that they are engaged in by 
individual agents, and particular in that they have a particular end 
as their objectlO• No collective measure or authoritative ruling is 
of any practical relevance except by virtue of its relationship to 
individual actions. It unavoidably follows that the cornmon good 
cannot be reached simply by making authoritative decisions for 
the political community. The common good can only be reached 
by a policy that moves the individual citizens to act for the 
common good. This can best be done by creating an artificial 
order and organization, a stable pattern of social action that gives 
8. Summa theologiae ¡a Iloe90, 3. 
9. Cf. FINNIS, Natural Law and Natural Rights, p. 231 pp. 
10. This is part of the very definition of practical reason in the perennial 
philosophy: according to it, practical reason is that aspect of reason that deals 
with operables instead of intelligibles, i. e. with what one is to do instead of 
what one understands. 
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individual citizens the direction and guidance that is necessary for 
ordering their actions to the cornmon good. 
Where it is important but unlikely that nearly all individual 
citizens can order their actions to the common good, the public 
policy is to provide the citizens with a substitute measure, 
measured by the common good, to which they can easily order 
their actions to the proximate satisfaction of the requirenients of 
the common good. In other words, where citizens run a risk of 
having no general grasp of what the common good in every 
single situation may require, the public policy gives them 
authoritative direction by which they are hoped to abide, so that 
despite their ignorance of the requirements of the cornmon good 
they would by implementing the policy meet those requirements. 
The general strategy of creating a public policy consists in 
relieving the individual citizens from the recurrent responsability 
for making a correct assessment of each particular situation where 
they are to make a choice, by making that choice for them· in 
sorne important respecto It follows that, if the policy is to be 
effective, it must be generally knowable, easy to be recognized, 
and readily applicable by most relevant citizens to most relevant 
situations. The best way - as far as we know - to create such a 
policy is by way of issuing general authoritative standards, i. e. 
rules. Authoritative rules categorize, generalize, and simplify the 
complexities of reality that threaten to cause problems is social 
interaction. Instead of having to make a difficult if not impossible 
judgment of the circumstances relevant for his action, the citizen 
can rely on the judgment previously made by the political 
authority, and act according to the rule laid down by it. 
A policy can, in sum, be effective only if it can affect the 
actions of individual citizens. So as to be capable of this, it must 
be knowable, clear, permanent, practicable, flexible but at the 
same time precise enough, consistent - in short, it must be 
expressed in general rulelike standards that are offered to the 
citizenry for guidance, in a hope for universal adherence. 
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Habitual adherence to these rules will, it is intended, habituate the 
individual citizens to the virtue they might not be able to exercise 
without authoritative counsel and direction, The external habit of 
acting by the rule will thereby grow into an internal habit of 
doing the right thing11 . Historically, such rules have usually been 
issued by way of legislation. 
Law 
Even if we have seen that it is practically necessary for the 
political authority to express its policies in general rulelike 
standards, if they are to be effective for the cornmon good, it is 
not thereby demonstrated that it is practically necessary to do it 
by public legislation of positive laws as they are understood 
today. Why law and not sorne other kind of general organization 
is (he appropriate method of generating civic virtue in a political 
cornmunity? 
The answer suggested by Aquinas12 is rather instructive, with 
all its apparent faults. He offers three reasons for preferring a rule 
by generallaws to a rule by individual judicial decisions. For one 
thing, 'it is easier to find the few wise men who suffice to frame 
rightful laws than the many required to judge aright about every 
single case'. Secondly, 'framing the laws allows for a long time 
during which to ponder', while 'judgements on particular cases 
suddenly blow up', and 'it is easier to see what is right by taking 
many cases into consideration than by relying on one solitary 
case'. And thirdly, 'lawgivers judge on the generallie of the land 
and with an eye to the future, whereas magistrates have to decide 
on the case befo re them, about which they can be affected by 
sorne partiality, and this can impair their judgment'. 
11. Cf. Summa theologiae ¡a /loe 92, 1; 95, 1; 95, 3: ad 2. 
12. Summa theologiae r /lae 95, 2: ad 2. 
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In theory, the first reason offered may be true. But in reality I 
doubt that anyone can confidently maintain the elaim that those 
who actually are engaged in the legislative functions of a society 
are in fact wiser than those engaged in the judicial functions. 
Depending entirely on the actual mechanism for the allocation of 
wisdom, the argument is far from univocal. 
The second reason is at first sight curiously at odds with the 
general practical philosophy of Aquinas. After all, doing the right 
thing is for him, as it is for us, something particular that can only 
be done by an individual actor with a particular object in view13. 
But here he seems to be suggesting that where an individual 
judge may not be able to make a good judgment, the lawgiver can 
- even without knowing the actual circumstances of any 
particular situation where the legislative intention might come to 
be implemented. This is of course sheer nonsense: it is the 
individual judge, presented with the relevant circumstances of a 
particular case, that is in a much better situation for making a 
right judgment. 
The lawgiver indeed cannot even make a genuine practical 
judgment, because he must operate on sheer generalities: he 
engages in theoretical reasoning with the abstract rightness of a 
type of decisions in view, whereas only the judge can actually 
make a real judgment coneluding in real action, based on the real 
facts of the case. Besides, it is patently false that lawgivers would 
have more time at their disposal than judges. Anyway, it may be 
true that better judgments result from taking many cases into 
consideration, but this is, 1 think, precisely what judges do: they 
cannot judge upon a case as if it were isolated from all other 
cases. But on the other hand, it is only as that individual case that 
it can be rightly judged. The judgment of Iawmakers is of a 
13. The object of justice is the right thing, as argued in Summa theologiae 
lIa Ilae 57. 
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different kind altogether, and therefore there is really no pertinent 
comparison between the two judgments. 
The third reason is a variation of the second: it claims that 
general judgments abstracted from all and any particular cases are 
easier to make with a detached mind than particular judgments 
where the judge may feel personally involved. This may be true, 
but again there is no relevant comparison between the abstract 
pseudopractical reasoning of the lawmaker and the genuinely 
practical reasoning of the judge. The practical activity of making 
a particular judgment is altogether different from the theoretical 
activity of considering the general rightness of types of actions in 
abstract terms. AH Aquinas is able to bring home with his 
argument is that it is indeed easier to make disinterested rules of 
law than disinterested legal rulings. But as it is the latter that 
count where actual justice is concerned, it is no reason for 
maintaining that a rule by general laws is better than a rule by 
individual judgments. . 
In sum, it is not true, as Aquinas would seem to argue, that 
lawmakers are better equipped to making right judgments than 
individual judges are, or that the circumstances for making right 
judgments are more favourable in lawmaking than in making 
particular judgments. Two considerations are central: for one 
thing, lawmakers are not necessarily more virtuous than the 
judges; and for another thing, it is in the very nature of polítical 
decision-making that the policy laid down in a rule is not a 
practical judgment in act but only in potentiality. In every case it 
is the individual judge that turns that potentiality into actuality. 
Hence the authorative government of a political cornmunity rests 
anyhow ultimately on the individual judgment of the servants of 
the law (judges and officials charged with making particular 
decisions). So why bother with generallaws at all? 
The answer is that while the servants of law are no less 
virtuous than the lawmakers and while the lawmakers are no 
more capable of giving moral guidance to the citizens than the 
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servants of law, the servants of law are no more perfect for that 
than they are. That is, they suffer from the same kind of 
imperfection as all men do: they cannot grasp the whole relevant 
reality at once, but must reason from one thing to anotherl4, 
making mistakes and losing a lot in the process. Therefore, if 
their effort is to be for the overall common good of the 
cornmunity, their individual operations must be coordinated. 
This, again can most properly be done by issuing general rules for 
them to follow. These rules give direction to the servants of the 
law conceming the way in which they are to assess the actions of 
the private citizens in terms of the rules appropriate to the latter. 
The lawgiving authority is not morally superior, but it is 
politically more comprehensive than an individual judge: it seeks 
a more comprehensive end, and is therefore in an appropriate 
position to give authoritative direction to the judge with general 
rules. 
But judges are indispensabe as well. Due to the logical 
disparity between the general and abstract terms in which rules 
are issued and the particular and tangible nature of right action, 
the rules can attain their end only by being effectively followed. 
Now all citizens will not, or can not by their own effort, abide by 
the rules, but seek private goods at odds with the cornmon good 
sought by the rules. These deviants and recalcitrants, if the policy 
underlying the rules is to be effective, must when necessary be 
watched, controlled, reminded, instructed, restrained, yes, even 
coerced and punished for their own edification and for public 
example. For all this, judges and administrators of the rules are 
required. And these servants of the rules become thereby part and 
parcel of the organization created and maintained by those same 
rules. 
The strength of law as a method of organizing a political 
cornmunity derives precisely from the strong institutional 
14. Summa theologiae JO 79, 8. 
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structure of the legal system. No other method of coordination -
be it based on recommendations, persuasion, moral propaganda, 
voluntary cooperation in private organizations, or what not - has 
such a comprehensive array of means at its disposal where its 
actual implementation is at stake. John Finnis has argued15 that 
the law has a uniquely effective potential in that it can offer 
general fairness, security, protection, and universal enforcement, 
and all this with fair strength and certainty due to the 
comprehensiveness, pervasiveness, permanence, and coercive 
potential of the legal system as a whole. No other arrangement or 
organization can promise an effecti vity like that of the law. If this 
is true, and if the law is indeed the only potentially successful 
way of ordering the whole political community to the cornmon 
good, then it is practically necessary -if the common good is to 
be attained - that the cornmunity be ruled by law. 
Our conclusion, it must be underlined, is conditional: the 
necessity of law depends on the inferior effectivity of all 
alternative means of poli tic al organization. Therefore, the 
conclusion that law is necessary for the common good can 
without qualification only be valid in the general sense that if a . 
comprehensive organization of a whole political community in all 
its aspects is to be undertaken, law is on the whole the 
appropriate method. But where any particular task of political 
organization for any particular end in any particular part of any 
particular political community is concerned, it does not follow 
that law is the best, let alone the only, appropriate method, or 
even an acceptable method at all. Sorne other method of 
organization can always be more appropriate for a particular 
purpose, even if law should be the only acceptable method for the 
overall purpose of society. 
15. FINNIS, The Authority of Law ... , p. 133 pp. and IDEM, Law as Co-
Ordination, p. 101 pp. 
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The Rule of Law 
When Finnis argues that the prospective effectiveness of law is 
uniquely greater than that of any other means of social 
coordination, he makes it explicit that this is because an 
enterprise of law properly inc1udes what is often called the Rule 
of Law 16. The law is by far the most appropriate method of 
political coordination because it combines a set of features like 
universality, certainty, flexible continuity, fairness, reliability of 
procedure, constant predictability of enforcement, effective and 
fair repression of deviants and reca1citrants, etc. All these things 
in combination, says Finnis, make up the principIe of the Rule of 
Law. And it is precisely because of this unique combination of 
good features that the method of law, by default of any other 
method capable of serious competition, is necessarily to be used, 
if the poli tic al community is to be effectively ordered to the 
cornmon good of aH. 
The traditional Aristotelían theory takes the conc1usion we 
have reached through arduous argumentation as something rather 
evident: it is simply in the nature of the polítical cornmunity that 
it be governed by law, just as it is in the nature of the family 
community that it be governed by the directions of the 
paterfamilias l7 . But why is it in the nature of the political 
cornmunity to be ruled by law? The answer to this question will 
provide us with the key to the whole notion of government by and 
according to law. 
Of the different kinds of cornmunities it is the cornmunity of 
friendship where the good is most genuinely cornmon: everything 
is mutually shared between friends. Therefore it might well 
be argued that friendship, being in a way the most perfect 
16.FINNIS, The authority 01 law ... , p. 136. 
17. Different kinds of communities are on this view distinguished from 
each other by their respective ends and by the ordering principIes appropriate 
for direction the actions of their members to those ends. 
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community, provides the model, or ultimate standard, for all 
human communities. But, as we already noted, it is in the nature 
of personal friendship that it can obtain only between a few 
persons. A large and complex political community - and it is in 
the nature of the political community to be large and complex, as 
it is defined as an autarkic and perfect community - cannot be 
ordered to the common good through personal frienship. A 
different ordering principIe is required. 
The different principIe is that of a certain impersonal 
friendship. A simulacrum of personal friendship is created in the 
community so that the citizens would treat one another as if they 
were friends even if they are not. The principIe of this civic 
friendship is what has come down to us as the standard of justice: 
that which is the right thing to do, instead of that which is 
befitting for friends. 
An important moral aspect of government by law is that the 
political community is a community of morally autarkic and 
perfect persons, i. e. persons that have full moral responsibility 
for their lives. Therefore it is a requirement of justice itself that 
the morally responsible citizens be treated as capable of ordering 
their actions to rules for the common good: it must be left to their 
full personal discretion whether they are to act as required by the 
political authority or not. This can only be done by issuing 
lawlike rules of general application for them to follow, and only 
on the condition that their actions are also as ses sed by law 
enforcement officials according to the laws and by no other 
standard. Where the government rightly may expert the citizens 
to follow its prescriptions, the citizens equally rightly tnay expect 
that the government abide by its own prescriptions. A mutual 
trust like the one proper to friendship must obtain between 
authority and citizen, and as there is no personal friendship to 
guarantee it, it must be reinforced by the Rule ofLaw. 
And indeed here is the key to ~verything we have said so far: 
the political community, like any community, depends for its 
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functioning on a minimum of mutual trust between its members. 
Such a trust can, in the absence of true personal friendship, only 
be created, maintained and augmented if the reasonable 
expectation of every citizen to be reasonably treated by fellow 
citizens as well as by the public authorities is effectively 
reinforced among the bulk of the citizenry. Por this purpose the 
Rule of Law is tremendously important, for constant and certain 
rulelikeness in social action, combined with authoritative 
guarantees for enforcement against deviants, is the best catalyst 
for a healthy flourishing ofmutual expectancies that keep the 
fabric of society together. 
The law, in sum, seeks to motivate the citizens to act for the 
common good of the whole political community. This it 
characteristically does by laying down general rules for all to 
follow. If people can know the content and import of the rules, if 
they can trust that their fellow citizens also follow them, if they 
can rest assured that the public administrators and other servants 
of law enforce the rules as the rules themselves prescribe, a 
network of mutual expectancies regarding the behaviour of other 
members of the community is effectively created and maintained. 
If citizens can cherish a justified belief that they will on the 
average be treated as they can expect to be treated according 
to generally reasonable rules of universal application, they are 
freer to plan for their own actions in a relative security, and 
consequently more likely to act reasonably themselves. 
If the law is to be efficacious in bringing about the common 
good, there must be a general trust in its being largely followed 
and effectively enforced. Such a trust can only come about if 
there is a general congruence between the rules embodied. in the 
law, and the action of citizens as well as of ptiblic authorities. The 
principIe of the Rule of Law provides the guarantee for the 
growth of such a trust: a notion of strict accordance with tbe 
prescriptions of the law gives society that stable pattern of 
predictability that it requires for fostering the individual effort for 
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civic virtue. Hence it is practically necessary, if the common 
good is to be attained by law, that the principIe of the Rule of 
Law be heeded in that enterprise. 
This is the prospective aspect of the Rule of Law: asure 
expectancy, createdand reinforced by it, that my fellows expect 
that I expect them to expect me to expect them to expect etc. that 
everyone in the polítical community abides by the law, enables 
the citizens to view their future prospects with confidence. In 
short, it creates a prospect of continuity and stability which 
relieves citizens from taking into present account many dangers, 
difficulties and adversities that they would have to consider in the 
absence of a constant pattem of interaction. Only if the citizenry 
at large shares a genuine and constant belief in that the law is 
administered according to the law, can the law be good for its 
purpose. 
3. ITS PRACTICAL INAPPLICABILITY 
The problem 
The argument presented in the first part of this essay depends 
entirely on the philosophical presupposition that it is possible for 
individual human beings to act according to a law. Now it may be 
that all men naturally act according to the law of nature. But our 
case is different in that we have a real choice between acting 
according to the positive prescriptions of a law or noto In other 
words, when deliberating upon a possible action, we are asked to 
do what the law requires us to do in a situation like the one we 
are in, and that quite cortsciously. The crucial problem with this is 
that the rule extolled by the law is an abstract theory of what is 
appropriate to do in a given kind of situation, whereas the 
consequent action is a thoroughly practical and particular thing 
to do by precisely the individual person an no other for precisely 
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the present purpose and no other, and precisely in the unique 
circumstances that are at hand at the precise time of delíberation 
and no other. In theoretical terms, the problem is that of bridging 
the logical gap between theoretical abstraction and particular 
action. 
Modem practical philosophy has often lost this fundamental 
problem from sight, due to its own theoreticization, as it were. 
Thanks to the breakthrough of modem natural science, and to the 
consequent deification of the "scientific" method, it has become 
fashionable to treat problems of practical philosophy as if 
they were objects of ~ methodically "scientific" enquiry. This 
has led the modems to construe moral and polítical philosophy 
in terms of theories conceming what is universally good or just 
or otherwise appropriate, and to conceive of the principIe 
of universalizability - in any of its various guisses - as the 
centrepiece of ethical reasoning. The typical modem ethicist 
c1aims that the appropriate thing for one to do is what would be 
appropriate for others as well, should they be in one's place. Such 
a way of thinking can recognize no difficulty in linking general 
rules with particular actions, as the very method of assessing an 
action consists in construing a rule, as it were, about its propriety. 
But the perennial tradition, quite rightly I think, makes an 
important distinction between theory and practice, which - if duly 
appreciated - will have a considerable sobering effect on the 
modem philosophical discourse about moral s and politics in 
general, and about the Rules of Law in particular. Our problem is, 
then, how it is possible to bring the law - an act of the past by 
which a general stándard is fixed for universal application 
in future contingencies - actually to bear on future practical 
situations as they come up on particular occasions for individual 
citizens. 
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Theory and practice 
Before we begin to tackle our main problem, we must make 
clear how practical reasoning and knowledge differ from their 
theoretical counterparts. For this difference, as accounted for by 
the perennial tradition of philosophy, is the root of our problem. 
The basic perennial conception of human knowledge is that we 
know things by their intelligible essencel8 . In other words, our 
understanding and knowledge of reality is conceptual: when we 
know a thing, its essential concept enters our mind, which 
receives it. The intelligibility of a thing lies in its essence, 
whereas its material substance in itself, i. e. without being 
informed by a concept, is unintelligible. All this is really rather 
obvious, wherefore we need not be detained over disputes with 
regard to the plausibility of the psychological theories of Aristotle 
and Aquinas, which have indeed been very much disputed. It 
suffices for us to appreciate the rather basic point that human 
understanding is, by its very nature, conceptual: we cannot think 
or speak of anything, unless we have a conception of - and 
consequently - a concept for it. 
But our understanding is not like that of demons and 
angel s who see the intelligibilities of things immediately and 
simultaneously just as they are there to be seen 19. Human beings 
are corporeal creatures that must operate through flesh. 
Consequently human understanding also proceeds by way of the 
human body, more precisely through its sensitive faculties. In 
order for the mind to receive the abstract intelligibility of a thing, 
the body must first receive a sensitive impression of particular 
thing that is an individual actualization of its conceptual potential. 
And here is the difference between sensitive and intellective 
18. Even ifthe theory presented here is explicitly Thomasian, one need not 
be a Thomist to appreciate the gist of the argument, viz, the logical disparity 
between the universal and the particular. 
19. Summa theologiae JO 58, 3. 
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faculties: where the intellect only can receive abstract essences, 
the senses can only be aware of particular, singular things. For 
understanding to take place, both must cooperate. 
The sensations received by the outer senses are in the nervous 
system transformed into a sensitive image, sometimes called 
phantasm, of what is being sensed20. 
This image then presents itself to the mind, which abstracts 
from the image the intelligibility of the thing in question, which it 
then understands. The crucial thing to realize here is that the rnind 
is not only dependent on the senses for information, but it also 
has an active role in the process or understanding: it does not 
simply receive an essence like the senses receive impressions, but 
it does a bit of its own work on thé information presented to it by 
the senses, so as to participate in the making up of the concept 
which it is to understand. It follows that human concepts, while 
they are reflections of real essences, are partly the product of 
man's own making. An important consequence of this is that 
human concepts, being abstractions from reality, do not entirely 
reflect reality, but rather deflect it through the abstracting rnind. 
Concept is not therefore identical with reality. Rather it is reality 
generalized, universalized, simplified, subjected to a rule. Indeed, 
concept is a rule of a kind. 
Human concepts, then, capture things as they are as a rule, 
whereas the unique singular particulars, the instantia of the 
rule, are only understood by the human rnind indirectly, not as 
they .are in themselves but only as instantiations of the general 
concepts. Theoretical human reasoning considers the conceptual 
intelligibilities of things for the sake of truth itself, defined as 
correspondence with the given reality. A theoretical view is true 
if it correctly reflects how things are. But practical reasoning 
is different in that it is not exercised just for the sake of 
contemplating the truth, but it is put to a use. Practical reason is 
20. Summa theologiae ¡a 84-85. 
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that aspect of human reason that seeks an outlet in action. Where 
theory is contemplation of intelligibilities for its own sake, 
practice is doing things for a purpose. Practical reason is, then, 
about doing things for a purpose. 
From the fact that practical reasoning consists in deliberation 
leading to an action, follows a radical difference with theoretical 
reason. Practical reason cannot proceed merely by considering 
the abstract intelligibilities of things. The object of practical 
reason is not the natural object of the mind, the conceptual 
abstraction of a thing, but the natural object of the senses, the 
particular thing that is to be done. This is because action can only 
be performed with the bodily faculties, and these, being bound to 
time and place and inmediate contact unlike the mind, can only 
do one particular thing at a time. Doing does not take place by 
abstraction, and one cannot do things in general. When one does, 
one necessarily does singular, particular things, with particular 
purposes in view, and with particular and tangible consequences. 
In short, practical reason has a task that in a way goes beyond the 
very capacity of reason, i. e. to reach a genuinely particular 
conc1usion consisting in a singular action. 
Our fundamental problem is now c1ear: how can we choose to 
do a particular thing on the basis of general abstractions? This 
problem is at the core of all moral thinking, for the uniquely 
correct solution for each unique s-ituation of practical choice is 
therefore practically impossible to reach. The very difficulty if 
not impossibility of making a correct particular judgment is 
precisely one of the most crucial reasons for the necessity of 
issuing laws for the cornmon good of all. By way of issuing laws 
the political authority can try to alleviate the task of individual 
citizens, officials and judges inc1uded, so that these can decide 
according to the law, instead of being lost in the innumerable and 
detailed considerations that make each problem different from all 
other problems. 
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But the problem carries further. It is namely the case that the 
law consists in nothing but authoritative generalizations, 
abstractions, simplifications~ categorizations, c1assifications, yes, 
conceptualizations of reality. Or to beeven more precise, re-
conceptualizations, as the very point of a law is to define a thing 
differently from how it is previously conceptualized so as to 
make it more amenable to social interaction. It is in the essence of 
law that it be a general abstraction, wherefore it naturally belongs 
to the realm of theoretical reason21 • Law is an authoritative theory 
of what is the right kind of thing to do in a generally defined kind 
of situation. It follows that the abstractions of law diverge from 
reality even more than ordinary human conceptualizations, being 
authoritative re-conceptualizations of the world. Laws do not 
merely reflect reality, but they seek to subject reality to the 
human will. This makes them incongruent with reality, with the 
explicit purpose of effecting a change in it for the better. 
But what can be the appropriate bearing of general autho-
ritative rules on particular actions? This problem has two related 
aspects: the first aspect concerns the relationship between the 
particular rightness and the general lawfulness of a judgment; 
whereas the second aspect has to come to grips how it is possible 
at all to determine what the law requires to be done in a given 
situation so that one can act 'in accordance with the law'. The 
former aspect is the well-known problem of equity, while 
the latter is the not less well-known, but for sorne reason 
less appreciated, problem of contextual determination in the 
interpretation of law. 
Equality 
Is the rig~t thing to do always to act in accordance with the 
law? How do the general precepts of laws relate to justice? How 
21. Cf. Ralph MCINERNY, The Basis and Purpose oi Positive Law, 
p. 144 pp. 
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can the Rule of Law be mora11y or politica11y desirable if acting 
strictly by the book will often, if not always, be a wrong or unjust 
thing to do in the particular circumstances at hand? These 
questions come up if we fu11y appreciate the consequences of the 
fact that it is in the nature of laws to be general rules. 
Being a general rule precludes the possibility of being an 
appropriate standard for every and any particular contingency. 
This fundamental insight has been commonplace in practical 
philosophy ever since Aristotle introduced his metaphor of the 
leaden rule of Lesbos22. Laws generalize, universalize, and 
simplify reality by reducing the unique particular things a11 
different from one another into categories as artificial as they are 
authoritative. According to laws, things and actions are forced 
into categories where, in the absence of every possibility of 
identity, a greater or smaller degree of similarity in one respect or 
another is the dividing line imposed by the lawgiver. Laws 
operate by making sorne of the differences between persons, 
things, actions, and situations, authoritatively irrelevant, and by 
defining sorne of their similarities not only authoritatively 
relevant but also conclusive. In other words, laws impose exclu-
sionary reasons23 for action, reasons that exclude sorne reasons 
while they impose others. 
The function of laws is to relieve decision-makers from taking 
into account a11 imaginable details of every problem they face. 
But success in this basic function entails at the same time the 
natural defect of laws: being intended to be applied to particular 
cases, tbey are inherently incapable of foreseeing a11 possible 
future cases, and consequently incapable of providing a suitable 
22. For an illuminating discussion, vide. NoeI DERMOT O'DONOGHUE, 
The Law beyond the law. 
23. The term "exclusionary reason" has been made widely known by 
Joseph RAZ, 'The sense given to the term here is similar to Raz' but not 
necessarily identical. For a discussion of how 1 understand it, vide Prudentia 
[uris, p. 345 pp. and p. 400 pp. 
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solution to every and any situation that meets theabstract 
description of the law. The general abstractions in which laws are 
written simply fail to address sorne of the situations that come up. 
It follows that applying the laws rigidly as they are sometimes 
leads to unjustified judgments and morally unacceptable con-
sequences. A law may be generally just, as a theory of what is the 
right kind of thing to do in a given kind of case; but the same 
time sorne of its particular applications may be unjust, i. e. wrong 
things to do on sorne particular occasions. 
In practical reasoning the right thing to do is what ought to be 
done, never mind any rules that may demand otherwise. From the 
viewpoint of morality this goes for rules of law as well as any 
other theories of what is the right kind of thing to do. Therefore 
even judges and other law-enforcement officials ought to follow 
Aristotle's suggestion and discard the rigid rule of law for the 
flexibleleaden measure of Lesbos: equity. The particular justice 
of a judgment is fundamentally more important than the general 
justice of the law that is relevant for the judgment in question. 
Now the Rule of Law would seem to demand that judgments 
and legal decisions be made according to the law and not 
according to sorne different standard of equity or what not. 
Indeed we have seen that the cornmon good requires that laws be 
followed once issued, otherwise they will not be of good use. But 
a judgment that is wrong or unjust is also against the cornmon 
good, being against the good of sorne citizen. Hence it is clear 
that the Rule of Law, if it is to be an acceptable political principIe 
at all, must have an inbuilt facility for exceptions on account of 
equity: when the particular circumstances do not make an 
appropriate fit with the abstract circumstances described by the 
law, it ought to be possible, even according to the Rule ofLaw, to 
suspend the law on that particular occasion. The question only 
remains whether the Rule of Law can retain its credibility, and 
whether the legal system with such an inbuilt mechanism for 
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exceptions from the law can maintain its reliability in fostering 
stable mutual expectancies between citizens. 
The obvious answer is, 1 believe, that the law is able to 
engender much more popular trust if citizens not only can expect 
that laws are followed, but also that laws are suspended when 
they would work injustice. The particular rightness of each and 
every application of the law is part and parcel of the Rule of 
Law24. The political community would not be better off if were 
absolutely certain that alllaws were followed to the letter even if 
their applications should be unjust. But, on the other hand, it is 
equally obvious that it makes a great difference how equity is 
practised within the legal system. It must be practised carefully 
and with discrimination, and as something that belongs to the 
system of legal rule itself: one must at least keep up the 
impression that the Rule of Law reigns even if exceptions from 
particular laws are made. One way of doing this, as popular as it 
is dishonest, is never to admit in public that exceptions from the 
law are made, and that all judgments and legal decisions are in 
fact based on the laws even when they really are noto Besides 
being dishonest, such a popular deception also underestimates the 
capacity of citizens for making moral distinctions. It would be 
morally much more acceptable to give the citizens a chance to 
understand that it is in the nature of laws not to be applicable to 
all unforeseen situations of application. This, if any would 
contribute to the exercise and growth of civic virtue. 
Interpretation 
The preceding discussion on equity presupposes, as well as the 
whole notion of the Rule of Law does, that it is possible to know 
what the law requires to be done in a particular situation, and to 
24. Cf. the argument in Aulis AARNIO, The Rational as Reasonable, p. 1 
pp., according to which legal certainty includes not only the notion of legality 
but also that of justice. 
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apply the law on a case at hand on the basis of that knowledge. 
The assumption goes, in other words, that it is possible to give a 
precise meaning to the prescription of the law by way of its 
interpretation in advance, as it were, of its application to a 
singular problem, and then to apply that interpretation upon a 
particular occasion. Nevertheless, this assumption is utterly 
problematic, due to the nature of the interpretation of law25. 
Before the law can be applied to a case, it must necessarily 
be interpreted, so as to give it a fixed meaning, because 
uninterpreted it only carries a general meaning that has no direct 
bearing on any particular circumstance but only consists in 
an authoritative abstraction from particular circumstances. The 
general prescriptions of the law must be given a particular 
meaning through interpretation. In such a way, it is held, the 
logical gap between the universality of the law and the 
particularity of the case to be judged can be bridged. 
In modem legal theory one has traditionally assumed that the 
interpretation of the law primarily consists in an interpretation of 
its language indepeIldently from its circumstances. One has 
assumed that linguistic expressions, words and sentences, have 
clear fixed, and univocal meanings which can be universally 
determine~, and on which the true meaning of a law can be based. 
But this kind of thinking is based on a grossly misleading 
conception of language. According to a it, lexical item in a 
language corresponds in principIe to a given meaning, and the 
two invariably make a match, so that a given word always has the 
same invariable meaning. Accordingly, if the invariable meanings 
are found out by interpretation, then one can fix the correct 
interpretation of every sentence, too. Interpretation would be an 
intralingual business. 
The lexico-semantical view of language has been shown 
mistaken by the modem hermeneutical philosophy as well as 
25. For a more detailed discussion, vide Prudentia Iuris, p_ 357 pp. 
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by the general linguistics of today. General lingustics has 
introduced into semantics an element of pragmatics, founded on 
the notion that language does not me~ely consist in abstract 
sentences butin acts of cornmunication which must be interpreted 
as wholes before the meaning of any utterance can be un-
derstood. Hermeneutics, concurrently, brings attention to the fact 
that language acquires its meaning in a context which must be 
interpreted as a whole in order to catch the real meaning. Let us 
now look at how the interpretation of law takes place in a contexto 
The basic structure of legal interpretation is as follows: the 
law as issued is nothing but a set of possible meanings for the 
law; so as to find out what is the real meaning of the law it must 
be interpreted; the real meaning of the law is the one that makes 
sense in a context; hence an appropriate interpretation of the law 
is a result of an appropiate understanding of the relevant contexto 
Crucial for our argument is the identification of the relevant 
contexto 
Part of the relevant context of interpretation is of course the 
text in which the language to be interpreted is embedded. This 
means that the code of law in question as a whole, and any other 
relevant pieces of legislation, form the textual background of a 
problem of interpretation. The interpretation arrived at must be 
one that makes sense in the text, and which makes the text as a 
whole make sense. But this is not enough. Other considerations, 
like relevant theories of value and morality, provide a further 
context for an act of interpretation. So that an interpretation 
should make sense, it must meet the relevant evaluative and 
moral standards. Indeed, on the most comprehensive level, an 
appropriate interpretation must be such that it is not too sharply at 
odds with the relevant social and cultural context in which it is 
made. We can see that interpretation is not an intralingual 
business at all, but must encompass a wide range of con-
siderations not contained in the explicit language of the law. 
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The contexts mentioned aboye are amenable to theoretical 
reasoning in that one can be aware of them before one is 
confronted with making a legal judgment. In principIe, one can 
consider general theories of value and morality, as well as one's 
social and cultural environment, and form an informed opinion on 
what, at large, the law ought to be taken to mean, with a view to 
all that general information. But the relevant contextual factors 
are not exhausted thereby. Indeed the most important part of the 
relevant context is strictly practical: the particular context in 
which the judgment is to be made. This context, encompassing 
the persons involved, their lives and their possibilities, the 
particular actions and alternative choice s that are to be assessed, 
the particular things that are the objects of the judgment, the 
possible particular consequences to real pesons and things that 
may come about with the judgment, and so forth, is the most 
important context, because the very point of law lies in its being 
applied to particular practical problems. Hence it is only natural 
that an interpretation of the law must, aboye all, make sen se in 
each and every practical situation in which the law is to be 
applied. The general abstractions of law must be translated to 
something that has particular relevance for the case at hand. This 
again, can only be done from the particular facts of the case at 
hand26. . 
All this refects the rather basic fact that, in order for a 
judgment to be a genuine solution for a practical problem, it must 
be a judgment in practical terms, in other words it must be a 
particular judgment for individualized reasons. A legal judgment 
cannot, for all that it is a legal judgment, be a judgment in 
general, if it is to fulfil the purpose of law itself. But a particular 
judgment cannot be made on general premises like the law and 
26. Cf. Klaus GÜNTHER, Der Sinnfür Angemessenheit, p. 28 pp., where it 
is argued that applying a rule on a particular case differs from the justification 
of that rule not only in degree, like specific differs from general, but also in 
kind, like singular differs from universal. 
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the general contextual considerations identified aboye; a 
particular judgment can only be made on account of particular 
reasons for action. The particular facts of the particular case are 
these reasons, and they provide the judge with the most crucial 
context in which the interpretation is embedded. It follows that 
the interpretation chosen by the judge, if it is to be a relevant 
interpetation at all, is a result of his interpretation of the facts of 
the case. Hence the applier of law stand s in a curious situation: 
his supposed task is to interpret the law so that he can then apply 
his interpretation to the facts, but in fact he can only arrive at an 
interpretation of the law from an understanding of the facts; but 
these he, again, underestands from his previous understanding of 
the law. All in all, facts are interpreted from the law, and the law 
is interpreted from the facts. 
We can see now that it is impossible to give the law a 
practically relevantinterpretation independently from the facts on 
which it is supposed to be applied. There is no way of making a 
clear difference between interpreting the law and interpreting the 
facts. As a matter of fact, there is no way of applying the law on 
the facts, unless the facts are first applied on it. The strange but 
unavoidable consequence of all this is that it is logically 
impossible to act in accordance with the law, if by accordance is 
meant abiding with an interpretation of the law that has been 
reached in advance of being confronted with the practical 
situation in which one is supposed to act in accordance with the 
law. 
In short, it is impossible to know, in advance of one's action, 
by which standard one should abide according to the law. The 
appropriate standard can only be discovered in and by the 
deliberation that concludes in a particular choice to act in a given 
way. In this very choice is included the particular interpretation 
of law considered appropriate for the case at hand. Contrary to 
general belief, we cannot first know the law and then act 
accordingly; more likely we first act, and then know what the law 
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was for the purposes of that precise action. And for each future 
judgment or choice the law is potentially different, no practical 
situation being identical to another. 
Our conclusion is, then, that it is impossible to implement the 
Rule of Law, for the simple reason that it is not possible to act 
according to the law, but more likely one makes up the law while 
one acts. AIso cases of equity tum out to be ones where the law 
one makes up while one acts is so different from the law that has 
been issued by the lawgiver that it cannot even reasonably be 
claimed to be an application of that law but rather an exception to 
it. The Rule of Law is practically necessary for the common good 
of all, we have argued, but at the same time it is practically 
incapable of being put into effect. Is it nothing, then, but a logical 
chimaera that keeps up a beneficent social illusion? This is our 
question for the final section of this essay. 
4. THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING EARNEST ABOUT IT 
Its democracy 
A popular piece of theoretical argument as well as political 
propaganda has it that the Rule of Law is an important ingredient 
of democratic govemment, wherefore it ought to be regarded an 
important principIe of political morality, rather than just a rule 
goveming the application of laws. 
The argument goes roughly like this: In democratic go-
vemment, it is the citizens who govem themselves. As unanimity 
can rarely be reached, practical democracy must operate with the 
majority principIe. Minorities that disagree with the majority, by 
the very fact that they participate in the process of decision 
making even if they lose, accept the outcome of the process, in 
the hope that in sorne other time or in sorne other question they 
might be in the majority. This kind of decision making procedure 
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is fair, and consequently it would be unfair to break the rules 
issued by the majority just because one disagrees with them. A 
particularly gross unfaimess is involved, if those in authoritative 
positions - like judges and other servants of law - disregard the 
general will of the citizens and fail to act according to the laws 
that have been issued by the sovereign people. Therefore one 
should abide by the principIe of the Rule of Law, and failing to 
do it would be undemocratic. 
This chain of reasoning, rarely made explicit but more often 
implicitly assumed by poli tic al actors, has several weak points. 
Strong doubts can be raised on whether the citizens really govem 
themselves in any political cornmunity, be it called a democracy 
or something else. It can be questioned with good reason whether 
losers in a democratic vote in fact have incurred for themselves 
an obligation to abide by the conquering will of the majority. And 
it is c1ear that no sweeping statement like the one that breaking 
the rules made by the democratic majority is unfair can be 
succesful by and of itself. Questions of faimess are particular 
problems, just as any other problems of morality, and no abstract 
answers suffice to solve them on any particular occasion. Indeed 
the whole belief in the inherent superiority of democracy to other 
types of govemment is doubtful: it should be obvious for all that 
a democratic way of making decisions is quite unsuitable for 
many kinds of situations in which public decisions must be 
made27. 
It ispossible to dispense with all these misgivings if we 
consider the problem purely in the abstract: democracy may be 
ideally so defined that the objections listed aboye will·not apply. 
But then we must be c1ear on the fact that our argument has 
nothing to do with any real political cornmunity, for none of them 
have met, nor will meet, the stringent requirements of ideal 
27. For a more comprehensive critique of democratic ideology, vide my 
Sananen laista, legitiimiydestii ja demokratiasta. 
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democracy. But even it we consider ideal democracy, the chain of 
reasoning presented aboye suffers from another problem: It is not 
specific to democracy. Essentially the same reasoning will be 
valid about every and any kind of govemment, ideally defined. 
Thus we could say equally well that the Rule of Law is essential 
for a good monarchy, or for a good aristocracy. 
Indeed the Rule of Law is indifferent to the form of 
govemment, all it is concemed about is the cornmon good, for 
which it is practically necessary. It follows that the only 
restriction of applicability fo! the Rule of Law lies in its task of 
promoting the common good: if strict accordance with the law 
would fail to fulfil this task, then the Rule of Law ought not to 
apply. This is the inbuilt natural exception to the Rule of Law, 
and it has nothing to do with whether the govemment is a 
democracy or a tyranny. For even a tyranny ' can be for the 
cornmon good, if the relevant altemative is no political order at 
all. 
To claim that the Rule of Law is part and parcel of democratic 
govemment may serve important strategic objectives in the 
polítical turmoils where sorne countries may find themselves28, 
but deep down it is another trick by which the natural desire of 
the ordinary citizen to be able to trust the public authorities is 
surreptitiously tumed into a goodwill to whatever political 
objectives different groups wish to promote by labelling them as 
democratic. 
The Rule of Constancy 
Instead of trying to underline the moral desirability of the Rule 
of Law with an appeal to democracy, we ought to take a closer 
28. Among other things 1 have in mind here the recent recurring reports of 
the press from Eastem Europe, where the present political development and its 
problems are time and again referred to in terrns of democratic legality and the 
RuleofLaw. 
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look at the principIe, so as to abstract from it the essential content 
that is both practically necessary for the cornmon good - and not 
sheer illusion. I propose that this essential content, as it cannot be 
accordance with the law simpliciter, is accordance with the 
rulelikeness of the law, i. e. not so much abiding by the positive 
law as issued but acting in a lawlike manner. 
In the course of our argument we have come to the conc1usion 
that the Rule of Law is necessary for the cornmon good because it 
fosters among citizens a web of mutual expectancies necessary 
for each and every citizen's reasonable pursuit of good. Now it is 
not so that only a rule of positive law can foster mutual 
expectancies: rule by any constant order will do. But the positive 
law is, nevertheless, an especilly salient and uniquely applicable 
kind of order for this end, because of the effectivity of the 
arsenal it carries with itself for the purpose of ensuring constant 
application. Yet exceptionless application is not morally 
desirable. And what is more, any application in the way the law is 
supposed to be applied is, strictly speaking, logically impossible. 
All this lends itself to supporting the double conc1usion that, for 
one thing, rulelikeness in social interaction must be fostered; and, 
for another thing, it cannot reasonably be demanded that 
something that cannot be done, i. e. that laws be applied 
according to the conditions laid down by the laws themselves, 
ought to be done. 
Yet rulelikeness can only be effected iI the citizenry can at 
large trust that the issued rules are followed by other citizens as 
well as by government officials and courts of law. As a 
consequence, it would seem that the only way out of the dilernma 
is as follows: government officials and courts of law must 
maintain a reasonable rulelikeness in their actions without 
pretending to themselves that they are following the prescriptions 
of the law, while outwardly they must keep up the general belief 
that their actions, decisions and judgments have a reasonable 
. . 
congruence with the pr,escriptions of the law. Whether it is a good 
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idea for them dishonestly to give the outward impression that 
they are in fact making their decisions according to the 
prefabricated prescriptions of the law, or more honestly just to 
make a point of underlining the fact that their actions on the 
whole hold the law in due respect, may depend on the political 
maturity of the citizenry. But in every case, while we have not 
reached the bies sed state of the deified, it is necessary that the 
citizens be given the c1ear c1ue that in an important way it is the 
law that makes the actions of public officials meet the reasonable 
popular ex.pectations of the citizenry. 
It is useful, then, to maintain that it is because of the law 
that the reasonable expectations of the citizens are met, as it is 
the name of "the law" that traditionally rings "authority" and 
"obedience". It only remains to be investigated in what the 
rulelikeness really should consist in that is at play in the name of 
the law. 
The answer, 1 propose, lies in what the citizens reasonably 
expect from the officials that are supposed to enforce the law: a 
reasonable satisfaction of their mutual interest in continuity, 
coherence, constancy, and fairness in the behaviour of public 
officials. To put it in simple terms, law officials must make their 
decisions and judgments as the citizens have reason to expect 
them to make them. There is no point in trying to find out what 
people actually expect of the government officials; an ideal 
standard consisting in what they have reason to expect is morally 
more appropriate, as well as more practicable. Now what citizens 
have reason to expect is of course partly based on their own 
reasonable opinions,but most significantly these opinions are 
influenced by the information they can get regarding what they 
can reasonably expect. A large part of this information, again, is 
provided by the government. Laws as issued are pieces of this 
information, as well as are the public - and often publicized -
individual judgments and decisions made by the servants of law. 
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In short, the public officials, by making their judgments and 
decisions, give the citizens reason to expect that their future 
judgments in similar sítuations will be similar. That is at least 
what they are supposed to do. It follows that, if they are to fulfil 
their task, they ought at large to decide as they have decided 
earlier, to judge as they have previously judged, to act as they 
have acted before. In other words, they must go on as they were 
and are. This is what keeps the fabric of the political cornmunity 
together for the cornmon good of all. Reasonably unforeseeable 
judgments can create uncertainty among the potentially affected 
citizens; therefore they ought to be avoided, and judgments made 
ought to have been reasonably predictable on the basis of the 
previous behaviour of the relevant officials in the relevant 
respect29. 
By the fact that officials act as they used to act it is not 
guaranteed that they act justly or otherwise morally reasonably. 
That they act as they used to act is, nevertheless, incrementally 
for the common good of the polítical community, unless it is 
shown otherwise. And the sheer fact that things go on largely as 
they used to, gives the citizens the sense of certainly they need 
for the pursuit of a good life. An additional guarantee for the 
constant continuity of public behaviour is that the law exc1usively 
stipulates who is to make public decisions and how. If the law 
can clearly define the officials that are entitled to make 
authoritative decisions of supposed law-enforcement, ant if the 
force of legal authority can in fact make sure that no outsiders can 
influence the judgment of these officials, and that these officials 
always make their judgments and decisions according to a certain 
predefined and familiar procedure, then it is more likely that the 
29. From all this it ought to be c1ear that the crux in "what can reasonably 
be expected" is not the psychological reaction of individual citizens or the 
citizenry at large, but the continuity and constancy of the manner in which 
legal decisions are made by public authorities. 
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citizens can safely trust that "law-enforcement" will meet their 
reasonable expectations. 
This is the sense, 1 finally propose, in which we can 
meaningfully speak of the Rule of Law: the rule of legal authority 
that effectively monopolizes and organizes the activity of public 
decision-making in the political community. There are two 
crucial aspects to the Rule of Law so understood: first there is the 
continuity and constancy of rulelikeness that gives the citizens 
the necessary conditions of predictability and certainty; and 
secondly there is the brute force that at the disposal of poli tic al 
authority ensures a clearly defined monopoly of public officials 
over that activity which is generally supposed to put the law into 
effect. But the relationship of law as issued to law as supposedly 
applied is indeterminate to the point of contingency, and the Rule 
of Law in the sense of accordance with the law as issued, is a 
mere figment of wishful imagination. 
5. A POTSCRIPT FIVE YEARS LATER: THE SUBSIDIARY RULE 
OFLAW 
When 1 first wrote the text aboye, the principIe of subsidiarity 
played only a vague minor role in my thinking. Soon afterwards it 
began to take a more prominent shape as 1 began to ponder on the 
possible practical applications of the Aristotelian-Thomasian 
philosophy. It struck me that the common good in itself, as the 
abstract notion it is and devoid of universally valid particular 
applications, can ,hardly provide any concrete practical guidelines 
to how one is to seek the common good in a real society. Then . a 
deeper analysis of what the cornmon good may consist in yielded 
the principIe of subsidiarity as the major political corollary of the 
philosophy of the cornmon good. That principIe, finally, tumed 
out susceptible of being used as a rule of thumb, a measure 
-inexact, to be true, but still a measure - of right and wrong for 
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state policy and legislation. Recently 1 have used the principIe of 
subsidiarity to evaluate new legislation in civil and criminal 
procedure, criminal law, basic civil rights, taxation, welfare 
relief, and other fields of government activity. Here 1 will only 
briefly outline the essence of the argument from subsidiarity and 
point out how the Rule of Law relates to the principIe. The 
argument can be found only in an embryonic form between the 
preceding línes. Here it is made explicit. 
The starting point is the Aristotelian view of morality: moral 
action is about making oneself, about informing one's personality 
be one's choices, about becoming the result of one's own actions. 
Hence the punchword or morality is responsibility: everyone is 
responsible for one's own becoming. The task of the government 
is to help the citizens to bear their responsibility with sucess, "to 
make citizens good" as the tradition puts it. Now the way to 
become good is to subject one's actions to reason. With a constant 
habit of acting according to reason one is virtuous, i. e. good. 
Such a habit can only be acquired by personal practice: one's own 
actions and one's own choice s build up one's own virtue or vice, 
and no one can make another person good or evil. This applies to 
the state, too: no government can make its citizens good or evil 
by its own actions and its own choices. Hence the way a 
government can "make the citizens good" must be indirect: it 
must induce the citizens into making themselves good by their 
own choice. The cornmon good, 1 would argue, consists precisely 
in that the citizens make themselves good citizens. Hence the 
primaryresponsibility for the cornmon good líes with each citizen 
for his own parto and with the government only in a secondary, 
subsidiary manner. 
Now a good citizen, according to the view at hand, is nothing 
but a citizen who is capable of fully bearing his responsibility 
for the common good: i. e. a morally free, independent and 
responsible citizen who ishis own lawgiver, in one word an 
autonomous citizen. Hence the task of the government is to bring 
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out this freedom, independence and responsibility, not to repress 
it. The law is for this reason fundamentally a method of teaching 
the citizens to use their reason and free will in an autonomous 
manner. This it can do if it respects the subsidiary role of the state 
in a double sense: On the one hand, those citizens who need help 
for developing their own capacity for autonomy and virtue ought 
to be given such support, (subsidium) which helps them to 
assume personal responsibility for their lives. On the other, public 
support to citizens ought to be a last resort (subsidium) in the 
sen se that the government ought always to give each citizen the 
chance to make his life on his own, and that every act of public 
support a1ways ought to aim at making itself unnecessary, i. e. 
helping the needful citizen to become independent from the 
government. 
The Rule of Law rather obviously serves the principIe 
of subsidiarity in the first sen se as it helps to provide the 
society with a condition of relative security, certainty, safety, 
foreseeability, clarity, stability and constancy. If such a condition 
prevails, it is easier for the individual citizen to engage in 
developing his own personality and morality as he can rest fairly 
assured that things will at large remain reliable in how they are 
and predictable in how they will change. This relieves him from 
sorne of the more preoccupying basic worries of everyday life a 
human being has if he must live in constant insecurity. The 
conclusion of the preceding text presents this desirable effect as 
the most important funcion of the Rule of Law: if the law is to 
fulfil its task at all, it must be able to organize society in a fairly 
stable manner. But not just any organization will be for the true 
common good of all: An organization may be too lax, or too 
strict. In ot~er words, the Rule of Law will not be for the 
comnion good if the content of the laws is not for the common 
good - except in the meagre sense that the Rule of Law with any 
content will always be better than no Rule of Law at all. But if 
the Rule of Law is to be for the true common good, the content of 
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the laws must meet the mean of the virtue of prudent 
statesmanship: just enough regulation but not too mucho The right 
amount of regulation will match the educational level of the 
ordinary citizen: it willleave him with just so much responsibility 
and freedom as necessary in order to encourage him to assume 
more responsibility over himself and over the community, to 
learn civic skills, and to exercise civil virtue. The last thing, 
therefore, that the law is to do is to overtake an individual 
citizen's responsibility for choices he could reasonably himself 
bear the responsibility for if allowed to manage his life on his 
own. This is why 1 think many of the blessings of the modern 
"welfare state" need to be reassessed - but that would be another 
day and another story. 
Here we must make note of a second and morally more 
fundamental way in which the Rule of Law intrinsically relates to 
the political principIe of subsidiarity. The Rule of Law is, 
namely, also an echo of the Aristotelian notion according to 
which it is the law, and not persons, that govern a good political 
community. Often this idea is expressed in context with the 
polity, or the aristocratic democracy which Aristotle in a way 
thought the best form of government. But it could equally well be 
extended to the other forms of government, too: in any kind of 
political community, laws and principIes ought to govern, not the 
people who make the laws and coin the principIes. The thought 
behind this maxim touches upon the Aristotelian concept of 
citizen very deeply. It is part and parcel of the definition of 
citizen that he be free, equal and autarkic, in other words a fully 
responsible and self-sufficient autonomous persono It is the goal 
of the political community that its citizens · become perfect 
citizens, citizens simpliciter. But while the community is on its 
way to that perfection, the way to come closer to it is to treat the 
prospective full citizens as citizens, nevertheless, imperfect as 
they may be: citizens secundum quid. Only if they have a 
sufficient sphere of responsibility as free citizens can they 
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practice their skills and virtues and become more perfect citizens. 
The necessary minimum ingredient in that sphere of freedom is 
that each and every one be allowed to make one's moral choices 
on one's own, as the only way of developing a personal morality 
at all is to make such choices. Yet again, imperfect as the civil 
virtue of the citizens is, the government must sometimes interfere 
and give them guidance in certain matters. But, as Aristotle was 
so keenly aware of, there is only one way of interfering with the 
life of free, equal and autarkic citizens, without encroaching 
upon their basic sphere of autonomy. The poli tic al community 
cannot be governed paternalistically like a family, where the 
paterfamilias has all the responsability and his dependents none, 
because in the political community, by definition, there are no 
dependents: all citizens are equally self-sufficient. It follow that 
political government must not make choices for the individual 
citizen. Quite the contrary, when the government makes political 
choices, it must allow the citizens to decide on their own whether 
they accept those choice s of noto When the government interferes 
with the activities of citizens, the only way of accomplishing this 
is by passing laws, i. e. universal rules which the citizens can 
know and which they are morally free to obey or not to obey once 
they know them. 
It is only by laws that the government can appeal to the reason 
of its citizens. Only government by laws respects their rational 
human nature in the sen se that it proceeds on the assumption that 
citizens are capable of guiding their own actions rationally, and 
of understanding the reasons for acting as the law requires and 
not contrary to it. The alternative to government by law is 
government by manipulation, proceeding on the assumption that 
the citizens are incapable of assuming the common good as their 
own goal and undertanding good reasons for making their 
personal choices concur with the wishes of the government when 
necessary. Therefore the Macchiavellian task of the government 
is conceived of as choosing for the citizens and then manipulating 
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their actions so that they move in the desidered direction even 
without making informed choice s to that effect. The common 
method of manipulative government is by the stick and the carrot: 
when you want the citizens to refrain from something, show them 
a stick and watch them recoil; when you want them to go for 
something, show them a carrot and watch thero rush. Such a 
government by incentive rather than by law is today very 
cornmon, and is becorning more and more prevalent in the so 
called enlightened world. But it is an irnmoral government as it 
treats its subjects as irrational cattle rather than free rational 
citizens. It is abad government because it underestimates the 
capacity of citizens secundum quid to grow into CÍtizens 
simpliciter. If we truly appreciate the depth of this problem, we 
can easily understand why the Rule of Law - as opposed to the 
Rule of Incentive - merits a strong advocacy, and how the Rule 
of Law can transcend its formal nature and acqúire the position of 
a substantial principIe of government, as a warranty for respect 
for the rational citizen and his primary responsability for the 
common good. In that substantial sense, the Rule of Law 
represents that supreme reason in which the political animal is to 
actualize his specific potential and flourish as a full-fledged 
human being. 
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